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The Taub Faculty of Computer Science Events and Talks

Theory Seminar: An algebraic Proof of a Robust Social Choice Impossibility Theorem
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Dvir Falik (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
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Wednesday, 28.12.2011, 12:30
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Taub 201
An important element of social choice theory are impossibility theorems, such as Arrow's theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem, which state that under certain natural constraints, social choice mechanisms are impossible to construct. In recent years, much work has been done in finding robust versions of these theorems, showing that impossibility remains even when the constraints are almost always satisfied. In this work we present a general spectral technique for tackling such problems, and demonstrate it on a variant of Arrow's theorem.