דלג לתוכן (מקש קיצור 's')
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התפלגות רובסטית: מתמחור למכרז
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ניר בכרך, הרצאה סמינריונית למגיסטר
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יום חמישי, 14.4.2022, 10:30
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Zoom Lecture: 93646072404
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מנחה:   Dr. Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming that only the mean and range of the distribution of buyer values is known. We seek the mechanism that maximizes revenue over the worst-case distribution compatible with the known parameters. Such a mechanism arises as an equilibrium of a zero-sum game between the seller and an adversary who chooses the distribution, and so can be referred to as the max-min mechanism.
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