אירועים והרצאות בפקולטה למדעי המחשב ע"ש הנרי ומרילין טאוב

At the core of practical implementations of Quantum Communication in general and in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in particular is the usage of photons and quantum optical devices rather than ideal qubits and qubit gates.
The realistic photonic protocol, often combined with non-ideal devices, is vulnerable to various implementation attacks even when the underlying (ideal) protocol is proven secure.

Our work sheds new light on the said implementation attacks using several new tools which take inspiration from classical cybersecurity by considering the quantum equivalents of vulnerabilities, attack surfaces, and exploits.
We define “Reversed-Space Attacks”, which act as a generic attack surface computation and exploit method against imperfect receivers.

We give a concrete quantum-mechanical definition of “Quantum Side-Channel Attacks”, providing a meaningful distinction from other attack forms.
We also define a notion of “Quantum Fuzzing” as a tool for practical black-box vulnerability research, acting as a complementary tool to Reversed-Space Attacks.

The three tools we define are used to analyze multiple known QKD attacks, giving a better understanding of common attack building blocks and relations between attacks.
A direct conclusion is that the “Bright Illumination” attack,which was executed in practice before theoretical predictions, could have been found using our tools and perspective.