I will present a new approach for creating chosen ciphertext secure encryption. 
The focal point of our work is a new abstraction that we call Detectable Chosen 
Ciphertext Security (DCCA). Intuitively, this notion is meant to capture systems 
that are not necessarily chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure, but where we can detect 
whether a certain query CT can be useful for decrypting (or distinguishing) a challenge 
ciphertext CT*. 
We show how to build chosen ciphertext secure systems from DCCA security. We motivate 
our techniques by describing multiple examples of DCCA systems including creating them 
from 1-bit CCA secure encryption - capturing the recent Myers-shelat result (FOCS 2009). 
Our work identifies DCCA as a new target for building CCA secure systems. 
(This is joint work with Susan Hohenberger and Allison Lewko.)